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1 China:  A  Religious  State  is  the  published
version  of  a  series  of  lectures  given  by
John Lagerwey at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong and the University of Hong
Kong  around  2008,  offering  a
comprehensive  view  of  the  religious
dimensions  of  Chinese  state  and  society
throughout its long history as well  as in
the  deep  structures  of  traditional  local
communities.
2 The book is immensely rich in its breadth
and  in  the  profusion  of  historical  and
ethnographic details offered by one of the
very  few  scholars  in  the  world  with  a
virtually  unsurpassed  mastery  of  both
classical  sinological  scholarship  on
Chinese  (and Daoist)  religious  history  as
well as the ethnography of local ritual and
society.  Indeed,  Lagerwey,  who  has  just
retired  as  the  holder  of  the  prestigious
Chair of Daoism and Chinese Religions at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, and is
now a Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has, as an early collaborator of
the renowned Daoist scholar Kristofer Schipper, conducted authoritative studies on the
Daoist Canon as well as participant observation of Daoist priests in Taiwan and Fujian.
He later initiated a wave of local ethnographies and folklore studies in Southeast China,
publishing more than 30 volumes of field reports and oral histories by local scholars he
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has trained and nurtured. Most recently, he has been editing a monumental history of
Chinese religion, with substantial contributions by virtually all of the world’s leading
scholars in the field.
3 China: A Religious State draws on this massive body of research; though short, the book is
so replete with historical, ritual, and ethnographic detail that the reader may easily get
lost  in the thick jungle of  Chinese religion,  losing sight of  the big picture.  Such is,
perhaps, one of the objectives of the book – to show that not only is the conventional
intellectual  view  of  China  (whether  Chinese  or  Western)  of  a  civilisation  in  which
religion is but a marginal dimension completely false, but that this religious dimension
is so astonishingly rich and diverse that it cannot be reduced to any simple statement
or formulation. Reading China: A Religious State, we realise that if materials on China had
been available to Sir  James George Frazer over a century ago,  he could easily have
doubled the length of his Golden Bough!
4 It would be impossible to summarise this detail in a brief review; I will limit myself to
raising some questions or musings that arose to me after reading each chapter of the
book.
5 The  Introduction  argues  that  “China  is  a  religious  state  and  Chinese  society  is  a
religious society;” China is a sacred space traditionally conceived as a “continent of
spirits” (shenzhou 神州), a notion that should not be treated as a “mere” metaphor. It is
now known that the image of a rational, non-religious Chinese civilisation derives from
the  Jesuit  project  of  marrying  Christianity  with  a  secularised  Confucianism  –  but
Lagerwey  focuses  here  on  the  Confucians’  alliance  with  the  Jesuits  and  their
participation in their deception.  He argues that modernity began when symbol and
reality were separated, when the Protestant reformation asserted that the sacraments
are “nothing but symbols” or “mere metaphor,” devoid of intrinsic spiritual power.
Lagerwey reminds us that the idea of ritual as “nothing but” symbolism dates back to
Xunzi and Confucius, who advocated that ritual should be practiced to regulate the
emotions, “as if” the spirits of the ancestors were present, but not truly believing so
(p. 3). When the Jesuits arrived in the mid sixteenth century, Ming neo-Confucianism
was  in  full  swing  and  “the  neo-Confucian  elite  had  its  own  project,  namely,  to
transform society by ridding it of the rituals of shamans, Buddhists, and Daoists, and
putting Confucian rituals in their place” (p. 3). Thus, “neo-Confucian rationalism” was
ready to “make a deal” with “Thomist rationalism” as part of its project of replacing
China’s gods with neo-Confucian ancestor worship. Lagerwey thus argues that the
Jesuit-Confucian encounter was the meeting of two distinct and unwitting secularising
tendencies, one of which, the Chinese, had been advancing for 2,000 years.
6 This begs the question, however, of why, after 2,000 years, the Confucian rationalising
project had made so little progress by the time the Jesuits arrived – we now know that
China,  in  late  imperial  times,  was  an  intensely  religious  society,  as  this  book
demonstrates. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that, while Confucian learning urged
the gentleman to participate in rituals as if the ancestors or gods were present, they did
not  object  to  the  common people  believing  that  the  ancestors  and spirits  are  really
present,  and regulating  their  behaviour  accordingly  –  yi  shendao  shejiao以神道設教.
Thus, under Chinese orthopraxy, rituals should be maintained, and what is important is
to  participate,  with  the  freedom  to  consider  them  either  magically  efficacious  or
“merely”  symbolic  and socially  functional.  Thus,  while  the  secularising tendency is
always present in Confucianism, the secularising rupture is always absent. Hence the
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modern perplexity about whether or not Confucianism is or is not religious/a religion.
The Western experience, however, has been one of radical ruptures – first, as Lagerwey
notes,  differences  of  understanding  and  belief  about  the  possibility  or  not  of  the
“transubstantiation”  of  the  bread  and  wine  could  not  be  tolerated  among  the
participants  of  the  same  ritual  service,  so  that  separate  and warring  Catholic  and
Protestant churches were needed – and later, again, as atheists and religious believers
could  not  participate  together  in  the  same  rituals,  entirely  distinct  and  opposed
institutions  and  ideologies  had  to  be  created  for  the  “religious”  and  the  “non-
religious.” The apparent affinities between Jesuit and Confucian rationalism thus mask
a  substantive  difference,  which  hinges  on  the  Confucian  acceptance  of  ambiguity,
ambivalence, and indeterminacy in the name of social harmony.
7 Chapter One, “A Brief History of the Pantheon: Ancestors and Gods in State and Local
Religion and Politics,” presents a rapid overview, from pre-imperial to late imperial
times,  of  state-religion relations in China.  One focus is  on the Chinese rulers’  deity
worship,  noting  how,  with  each  new  regime  or  dynasty,  or  sometimes  with  the
accession of a new emperor, the ruler made significant modifications to the religious
system,  often sacrificing  to  different  deities  and supporting  some deities  and sects
while  suppressing  others,  who  may  have  been  favoured  by  the  previous  ruler.  As
Lagerwey argues, in China, “state=church” (p. 49), and “from the Shang ancestors to the
Longmen sect, this is a constant feature in Chinese religious history: it is dominated by
political decisions” (p. 54).
8 This fact raises several questions related to the modalities of the religious behaviour of
the imperial throne. For instance, an essential component of the Emperor’s assertion of
territorial  sovereignty was the worship,  by the Emperor or  his  officials,  of  local  or
regional territorial deities – such as the City Gods of each town, or the gods of the Five
Marchmounts (wuyue五岳). But how can imperial sovereignty be signified through the
supreme emperor or his agents worshipping lower,  more local  deities? Who, of  the
emperor or the deity, is subordinating himself to whom? And why did the imperial
regime so often change the “supreme” god that it worshipped – from Di 帝 to Tian 天,
Taiyi 太一, Laozi 老子, Haotian Shangdi 浩天上帝, Xuantian Shangdi 玄天上帝, and so
on? If the emperor, as the supreme power on earth, needed to worship his counterpart
in Heaven, why change his name and cult? Perhaps we need here to reconsider our
concept of the “worship” and “cult” of a god, possibly derived from the notion of the
Abrahamic  God  who  demands  absolute  submission,  and  for  whom  worship  is  the
embodied expression of submission. Perhaps something more subtle and ambiguous is
at play in the Chinese case – sacrifice being an instance of “gifting” and “hosting” in an
anthropological sense, the ritual formation and renewal of an alliance in which both
parties possess, maintain, and exchange power (see forthcoming work by Adam Chau).
A Chinese deity is a nexus of social relations, a node of spiritual powers related to place,
and  a  materialised  body  of  narratives  and  memories  –  all  linked  to  at  least  one
organised interest group in society. Thus, the emperor’s sacrifice to a deity would be
the ritual construction and maintenance of a political alliance with this network of
powers. Imperial sovereignty is thus maintained by keeping itself at the centre of a vast
system of localised networks of powers. With a new dynasty or regime, new networks
of power need to be established – this might partially involve retaining portions of the
old regime’s network, but also partially involve creating a new one. Which deities and
sects would rise or fall in this process would be the result of the give and take between
powers and interests. While we tend to conceive of the political game as a negotiation
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between humans, in China it  might be useful to see the role of deities,  rituals,  and
temples as mediating objects in the political game.
9 Such a perspective might give us insights on “Daoist Ritual in Social  and Historical
Perspective,”  which  is  the  subject  of  Chapter  Two.  Discussing  the  Daoist  Heavenly
Masters tradition 天師道, Lagerwey stresses the oft-noted bureaucratic organisation of
the pantheon and the role of the Daoist priest as an official mandated to send forms
and petitions on behalf of the people to the relevant offices of the celestial government.
Daoist  ritual  mediates  a  celestial  world  of  official  documents,  record-keeping,  and
lawsuits, combined with a concern with healing and immortality. With the revelation of
the Lingbao 靈寶  Canon around AD 400, Mahayana Buddhist concerns about karma,
cosmic retribution, and universal salvation are integrated into Daoist ritual, turning it
into a “universal religion” (p. 70). Through further changes and transformations, we
see Daoist ritual evolving in many directions, ranging from refined court ceremonies to
integration with the local deities and spirit-mediums of village religion. There we see
the dual role of the Daoist priest, as minister (chen 臣) in the sublimated court of Dao,
and as  general  (jiang  將)  vis-à-vis  the  local  spirits  and demons –  a  complementary
distinction  played  out  in  the  civil-martial  (wen/wu 文武)  structure  of  much village
ritual today. Local spirits may be either absorbed into the Daoist hierarchy as lower-
ranked minions or fought as unruly, bloodthirsty demons. The role of the Daoist ritual
institution  in  negotiating  relationships,  alliances,  or  conflicts  between  local  and
universal deities and forces is clear. It thus played an indispensable role both for local
communities  and  for  the  imperial  throne  in  their  formation  of  religio-political
alliances, providing a common but multivocal ritual and symbolic language for working
through their relationships.
10 In chapters Three and Four, “Festivals in Southeastern China” and “On the Rational
Character of Chinese Religion,” we are treated to a cornucopia of ethnographic titbits
drawn from dozens of villages, towns, county seats, and mountain temples. Faced with
the bewildering diversity of material, Lagerwey concludes that “The first observation
to be made of this material concerns its richness, the second its unity.”
11 How can we make sense of both the unity and diversity of these local festivals? A few
thoughts come to my mind: on the one hand, all of these popular customs are rooted in
the same Chinese cosmology and “demonological paradigm,” to use Barend J. ter Haar’s
formulation: the festivals have both a life-affirming, life-generating function and an
exorcistic or prophylactic function of protecting the community from ghosts and
demons, which are associated with the dangerous world outside the community. Local
deities have an intimate connection to the demonic realm: sometimes former demons
themselves, they know how to fight the evil forces. Hence, they make good allies for
communities in search of a protector. But, lest they remain too close to the wild and
demonic  ways,  they  also  need  to  be  firmly  anchored  to  the  realm  of  order  and
civilisation – hence the attempts of both Daoism and the imperial state to integrate
them into their pantheons and ritual systems.
12 I  have suggested that  the “cult”  of  a  Chinese deity  should be seen as  a  reciprocal,
gifting alliance between a human group and the deity, in which both parties are seen as
having  some  power  over  the  other.  On  the  side  of  the  human  groups,  we  see,  as
Lagerwey points out, the sophisticated methods by which, through the festivals of the
deities, they organise their own alliances between social groups – be it the different
lineages of a village, the different villages of an irrigation system, the different streets
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of a town, or even the different segments of a street. The specific setup – which groups
will take turns to organise the procession, or the route and order of the procession, or
the amount each group contributes to the overall cost – is a function of the balance of
power between the groups, both in the past and in the present. The configuration also
reflects,  or  contains  traces  of,  the  relationships  between  the  groups  as  they  stood
several  generations  earlier,  but  they  may  also  be  modified  to  reflect  more  recent
changes. The deities and their festivals are thus structuring mediators, giving form to
the community’s relationships within the sub-groups that compose it,  and its outer
boundaries and negotiations with other groups and with the demonic world outside.
The infinite possible combinations, even within a small geographic area, of ecological
niches, historical particularities, and social groups and subgroups can thus give rise to
endless permutations, always varying in their “words” and “sentences,” as Lagerwey
puts it, according to the same basic grammar of Chinese religious cosmology.
13 To conclude,  then,  China:  A  Religious  State  is  an  impassioned  argument  for  putting
religion at the centre of our understanding of Chinese culture and society, from the
smallest village to the imperial state. But to admit to such a perspective is only the
beginning of a new path of inquiry – since “religion,” as we find it  in China, in its
bewildering diversity and complexity, is a far cry from the simplistic notions we have
inherited  from  Western  experience  and  secularist  ideology  highlight  a  sociological
viewpoint and avoid reflection on the political regime.
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